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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

------------------------------------------------------------DIANE E. KAPETANOV, on
behalf of herself and
others similarly situated,
PlaintiffsAppellants,
-v-

SMALL CLAIMS COURT OF
OGDEN, UTAH
DefendantResponden t.
STATE OF UTAH, OFFICE OF
RECOVERY SERVICES,
Intervening
Respondent.

Case No .

1 81 8 2

BRIEF OF INTERVENING RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Memorandum Decision dated
November 24, 1981, by Judge Ronald O. Hyde of the District
Court of Weber county, State of Utah.

Specifically, Plaintiff-

Appellant appeals the trial court's denial of a Motion for a
Writ of Prohibition on the basis that the Small Claims Court
is a court of appropriate jurisdiction for the determination
of Food Stamp fraud cases.
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DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The Se,cond Judicial District Court of Weber County
denied Plaintiff-Appellants' Petition for Writ of Prohibition
in which she and others similarly situated have sought to
prevent the Small Claims Court from exercising jurisdiction
in cases in which the State of Utah, Office of Recovery
Services, seeks to collect on food stamp overpayments where
fraud is alleged.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Intervening Respondent prays the Court uphold the
decision of the Second Judicial District Court denying Plaintiff-Appellants' Writ of Prohibition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Appellant, Diane Kapetanov,

(hereinafter

Plaintiff-Appellant), applied for and received food stamp
assistance from the State of Utah during October and November,
1979.

On a review of her eligibility, November 28, 1979, she

failed to report income from her son, though in boldface type
the question asked "Are you, or ANYONE in your household,
employed full or part-time?

a.

If yes, list their names,

where employed and date they started work."
The Assistance Payments Administration was notified
by Job Service that Plaintiff-Appellant's son was employed.
Verification proved the combined income caused the family to
be wholly ineligible for benefits.
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Many contacts were made with Plaintiff-Appellant
and her attorney by the Office of Recovery Services informing
her of the cause and amount of overpayment and seeking repayment from her.

When she did not make any repayment, notice

was sent indicating legal action would be taken.
On June 16, 1981, a letter was sent specifying that
a judgment would be sought against Plaintiff-Appellant.

A

complaint was filed in Small Claims Court specifying the debt
was for collection of an overpayment - unreported income.
Said complaint was served upon Plaintiff-Appellant.

She did

not appear at the hearing and a default was entered.
At request of Plaintiff-Appellant's counsel, the
default was set aside and a new trial date was set.

She was

represented in the second proceeding by Utah Legal Services.
Utah Legal Services moved that the Court dismiss the action
for want of jurisdiction, which motion was denied.

Utah Legal

Services was given the opportunity to request a Writ of
Prohibition from the District Court and the evidentiary matter
was continued until after that time.
On October 2, 1981, the matter was heard in the
Second Judicial District Court of Weber County.

On November

24, 1981, the court entered a Memorandum Decision denying the
Petition.

From that decision, Plaintiffs-Appellants have now

appealed.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE FOOD STAMP ACT SETS FORTH
THREE ENTIRELY SEPARATE MEANS OF COLLECTION
OF FOOD STAMP OVERPAYMENTS.

The regulations set forth by the Department of
Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service as implementation of
the Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 CFR 270 et seq.

(1981),

establishes both a means for collection of food stamp overpayments by the State and an obligation to do so.
273.15, 273.18 (1981).

See 7 CFR

Three processes are separately set

forth in order that persons may be afforded full due process
when an overpayment claim is made.
The first means of collection is an administrative
procedure.

Concern was taken to insure adequate due process

protections would be given in such a nonjudicial setting.
In the General Comments Section of 43 Fed. Reg. 47845, 47846,
(1978), there is clarification of the policy for administrative
proceedings as applied to fraud disqualification.
"SOil'e State agencies expressed ooncem over
the ronsti tutionali ty of administrative fraud
hearing procedures and cited State la.vs which
require that fraud be dete.rmined only by oourts.
Notwithstanding State law 1 Congress has authority
to provide an administrative procedure for disqualifying individuals from Federal benefit programs who have conmitted fraud so long as the
ronsti tutional requirements of due process are
met. The Department carefully considered those
due process r~uirements in establishing the
fraud hearing standards. In addition, the tenn
"fraud" is strictly defined in the regulations
to protect the individual and to assure that
the adm:i.nistrative detennination of fraud is
applied consistently."
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Although the matter before the Court does not
involve disqualification (Comments Section 45 Fed. Reg.
7208 (1980)), the concerns about administrative procedure
are pertinent to the matter at hand.

The subsequent conunents

about fair and fraud hearing procedures elaborate upon the
concerns about administrative procedures.
The State, through the Office of Recovery Services,
(hereinafter State), may also proceed civilly for collection
through a "Court of appropriate jurisdiction", 7 CFR 273.18 (c).
Again, procedures for civil collection are intertwined with
those for disqualification, but in Section 273.lB(c) (2) (ii),
administrative repayment is extensively discussed ending with
the following:
. A written demand letter for an unpaid
or partially paid claim shall be sent even if
the household has previously received a nonfraud
demand letter because the time period covered by
the claim and the method of rollection are
different for fraud and nonfraud clairrs. In
addition to the written agreeirent letter, a
personal contact shall be made, if possible.
THE STATE AGENCY MAY ALSO INITIATE CIVIL CDURr
ACTION 'ID OBTAIN THE CLAIMo (emphasis not in
original)
o

Office of Recovery Services may also prosecute food
stamp recipients criminally for fraudulent receipt of food
stamp benefits.

Section 273.18 (c) (2) (i) states:

The State agency shall initiate such rollection
unless. . . the legal representative prosecuting a
IIEITlber of the household for fraud advises , in
writing, that oollection action will prejudice
the case. In cases where a household rrember was
FOUND GUILTY OF FRAUD by a oourt, the State agency
shall request the matter of restitution be brou:rht
before the a:>urt. (emphasis not in original)
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The sections on disqualification which precede
the collection section address administrative disqualification,
and, in doing so, specify which cases are appropriate for
civil or criminal action, to-wit:
(d) ADMINISTAA.TIVE DISQUALIFICATION. Each
State agency shall establish procedures for
cnnducting fraud hearings which must confonn
with the procedures outlined in this section.
An administrative fraud hearing should be
initiated by the State agency in cases in
which the State agency has sufficient
documentary evidence to substantiate that an
individual has conmi tted one or rrore acts of
fraud as defined in paragraph (b) of this
section. Such cases may include those in
which the State agency believes the facts of
the individual case do not warrant civil or
criminal prosecution through the appropriate
court system. other cases may be those
previously referred for prosecution but for
which prosecution was declined by the
appropriate legal authority. 7 CFR 273.16 (d)
These three procedures are clearly separate in the
regulations.

Criminal and civil proceedings are clearly

separate in the law.

See Utah Code Annotated, 68-3-4 (as amended).

Also see Gross v. U. S . , 2 2 8 F . 2 d 6 O2 , 614 and 615 , ( 19 5 6 ) .
Administrative rules for conduct by a department regulate that
department and cannot regulate due process by a court.

The

administrative rules for fair and fraud hearings were adopted
to insure only that the State did not abuse the administrative
process and said guidelines are separate from the civil and
criminal proceedings.

A careful reading of the regulations

demonstrates that the failure to specify that the civil and
criminal judicial determinations were to also be subject to
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those rules was pointedly, necessarily and intentionally
done.

The regulatory rules do not apply to the judicial

system.
POINT II: THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULES
ARE TO REGULATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, NOT TO REGULATE JUDICIAL
PROCEDURE.
To support the theory of the Plaintiff-Appellants in_
this action, one would have to discard the separation of powers
doctrine.

Plaintiff-Appellants' entire argument is based on

her assertion that the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court
is governed by the same rules as those for administrative
proceedings.
The separation of powers doctrine established as the
prevailing rule that there shall be a complete separation of
powers without qualification.

O'Donoghue v. U.S., 53 S Ct 740

289 U.S. 516, 530, 77 L Ed 1356 (1933).

One department should

not act to control or embarass another.

State ex rel Kostos v.

Johnson, 69 NE2d 592, 595 (Ind 1946).

Although there have been

numerous exceptions to the rule, the intent of such a policy is
intact.

The Department of Agriculture cannot, therefore, propa-

gate rules which would govern judicial procedure.

To allow such

a policy would cause the judicial system to be at the mercy of
the constantly changing regulations of differing administrative
agencies.

For example, the Department of Agriculture could

require 30 days notice and another department require no more
than 10 days.

Such chaos was not the intent of the regulations

in question.
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The purpose of the substantial procedure set forth
in the regulations was to insure there would not be an abuse
of due process in the administrative system.

At no point in·

the regulations does it state that such procedures must be
utilized in civil or criminal judicial proceedings.

In fact,

numerous times procedure is carefully enumerated for administrative proceedings and concluded with a single sentence that
the State may also collect civilly or criminally.

See 7 CFR

273.16, 273.18(c).

Any noncompliance with administrative regulations
by a department does not eliminate the Court's ability to
hear the matter, but is a matter for the court to consider
as i t determines the State's right to a judgment.

Noncompli-

ance with regulations by a State could result in penalties
by the Department of Agriculture or in

the court's deter-

mination that the State does not have a valid claim for
money judgment.

The defendant in any such action could raise

as a defense the State's failure to provide the protections
afforded in administrative proceedings.
Perhaps the fallacy of the Plaintiff-Appellants'
arguments becomes most clear when applied to District Court.
The Plaintiff-Appellants' argument would mean the District
Court could not exercise jurisdiction in a matter if the State
failed to comply with regulations.

The District Court does

have jurisdiction to determine money owed and even to declare
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the rights of the parties, and failure of the State to
comply with administrative regulations would be a consideration
of the court in awarding a judgment, but not reason to deny
the Court jurisdiction.

The District Court, without question,

would have jurisdiction in determinations of food stamp fraud.
The ridiculousness of Plaintiff-Appellants' argument
as to jurisdiction of the judicial system reaches its extreme
in this matter.

If Plaintiff-Appellants' argument were

followed to the logical conclusion, even this Court, the
Utah State Supreme Court, would be unable to hear this very
matter if the State were found to have failed to comply
with the administrative regulations.

The actions of an

administrative body would rob our Court of jurisdiction
which would otherwise be proper.
The intent of the term "court of appropriate
jurisdiction" is not to regulate administratively which court
is appropriate, but to refer to the judicial system and to
develop an alternative to judicial action by administrative
procedure.
The administrative rules referred to do not govern
judicially enforced repayments and do not apply to the case
at hand.
POINT III: APPELLANT WAS ACCORDED FULL
DUE PROCESS IN SMALL CLAIMS COURT.
The Plaintiff-Appellants have been afforded adequate
due process protections.

The United States Supreme Court has
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stated in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 US 471, 33 L Ed 484, 92
Ct 2593:
Once it is detennined that due process
applies, the question remains what process
is due. It has been said so often by this
Court and others as not to require citation
of authority that due process is flexible
and ~alls for such procedural protections
as ·he particular situation demands. Consideration of what procedures due process
may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a detennination of
the precise nature of the gove.rrurent function
involved as well as of the private interest
that has been affected by governmental
action... Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Union vs. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 6 L
Ed2d 1230, 1236, 81SCt1743 (1961). To
sey that the concept of due process is
flexible does not rrean that judges are at
large to apply it to any and all relationships. Its flexLbility is in its soope
once it has been detennined that sane
process is due; it is a recogri. .tion that
not all situations calling for procedural
safeguards call for the sarre kind of
procedure. Supra at 481 (19.72)

s

1

The Plaintiff-Appellant was accorded full due process rights
in small claims court.

She was personally served with a copy

of the Affidavit stating it was for an overpayment with the
State and further specifying it was based on unreported income.
The Affiant in Small Claims Court must attest that he/she
has demanded payment but that defendant refused to pay.
Code Ann., 78-6-2,

(as amended).

Utah

The defendant also had the

right to present witnesses and evidence in the case.

Utah Code

Ann., 78-6-7, (as amended).
The plaintiff in Small Claims Court, the State, had
many contacts with both Plaintiff-Appellant and her counsel.
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At one point, action was completely deferred for six weeks
at request of Defendant's counsel.

Several letters were

then again sent before the case went to Small Claims.
Plaintiff-Appellant had months of notice before judgment
was granted and then it was set aside to allow appearance of
counsel.
Small Claims Court also provides for a de novo trial
in District Court should the defendant be dissatisfied.
Utah Code Ann., 78-6-11,

(as amended).

Such an appeals

procedure insures every due process protection to the defendant.
Additionally, the defendant in Small Claims Court
has the opportunity to have the determination of fraud made
by a judicial officer who is well acquainted with the statutes
and case law pertaining to fraud.
All of these due process rights have been afforded
the defendant and to all members of the class in this action.
POINT IV:
THE SMALL CLAIMS COURT HAS
JURISDICTION IN THIS MATTER.
The Small Claims Court has similar jurisdiction to
the Circuit Court with the limitation being that jurisdiction
is limited in Small Claims to cases for "money only" where the
sum claimed does not exceed $400.00.

Utah Code Ann., 78-6-1,

(as amended) sets forth the creation of the Small Claims Court,
to-wit:
"There is hereby created in the circuit
rourts and justice's courts of this state,
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_,,_

a department to be known as the "S:MALL CIAIMS
C'OURr" which shall have jurisdiction, but not
exclusive, in cases for the recovery of noney
only where the anount clailred does not exceed
$ 400 and where the defendant resides or action
of indebtedness was incurred within the jurisdiction of the court in which the action is to
be maintained. Persons or rorporations may
litigate actions on behalf of themselves in
person or through authorized employees or
~th.out counsel."
Utah Code Ann. 78-6-1 (as
am:mded)
Since Small Claims Court's jurisdictional definition
does not specify what types of cases are meant by "cases for
the recovery of money only", one must consult the mother
statute in which those civil actions which may be taken in
Circuit Court are specified, to-wit:
(1) The circuit rourt shall have civil jurisdiction:
(a) In actions arising on contract, for
the rerovery of noney only if the sun
cla.i.m=d is less than $5,000, exclusive
of rosts or court.
(b) In actions to recover a fine, penalty,
or forfeiture less than $5,000 given by
statute or by ordinance of an incorporated
city or ta.vn.
Utah Code Ann. , 78-4- 7 (as anended)

The statutory definition specifies two types of cases
which are for "recovery of money only".
arising on contract.

--

The first is for actions

The second is to recovery a fine, penalty

or forfeiture.
This action fits jurisdictionally in both areas.
The application Plaintiff-Appellant signed to receive benefits
states the requirements for reporting changes in the household.
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Plaintiff-Appellant agreed to provide such information as
a consideration for receipt of benefits.

When she failed to

provide such information, she breached the agreement for.
benefits.

When the State filed the Small Claims affidavit,

the State asked for "money only" , return of the money they
expended to Plaintiff-Appellant when she was ine·ligible.
Jurisdiction in Small Claims Court was also proper
because the State of Utah, Utah Code Ann., 78-4-7 (as amended) ,
and Federal Government, 7 CFR 273:18, require that food stamp
assistance received improperly must be repaid.

Such statutorily

mandated repayment would be a fine, penalty or forfeiture under
the jurisdiction definition.
Nothing more than money has been sought in Small
Claims Court.

Plaintiff-Appellant asserts that an order of

disqualification could be ordered by the Court without motion
by the State.

Such a position is not supported in logic.

If,

in fact, the State chooses to proceed in Small Claims Court for
a money judgment, they have also chosen, by virtue of the
ju~isdictional limitations of Small Claims Court, to not have

a judicial determination of disqualification.

If disqualifi-

cation was requested, the Small Claims Court would simply deny
the request as not being a money judgment.

A declaratory

judgment as they call it, need not be granted where there is
an adequate remedy at law as in this case.

Plaintiff-Appellants

assert that a determination of fraud cannot be made by the
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Small Claims Court.

This issue will be fully addressed in

the next section.
Plaintiff-Appellant has also alleged that the Small
Claims Court was not intended as a court of proper jurisdiction
and cites in support, 7 CFR
brief at page 15.

s 273.16(e) (2).

Plaintiff-Appellants'

Plaintiff-Appellants misrepresent the

regulations in arguing that an amount less than $400.00 is
not a "large amount" as defined in the regulations.

Although

no reference is made to a minimum collection amount for fraud
claims, at 7 OFR 273.18(b) (3) (A), the minimum amount for nonfraud claims is designated as $35.00.

Since all fraud claims

must be handled as nonfraud until a determination of fraud
is made in an administrative hearing or by a court of appropriate jurisdiction, it would appear that the $35.00 minimum
would also apply to fraud claims.

7 CFR 273.18(c).

Jurisdiction of this matter is proper in Small
Claims Court.
POINT V: A DETERMINATION OF FRAUD IN
FOOD STA.MP OVERPAYMENT CASES IS NOT
A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT.
Plaintiff-Appellants argue in their brief that the
determination of fraud in a food stamp overpayment matter
before Small Claims Court is a declaratory judgment.

Their

position is unfounded in law and in fact.
For their argument Plaintiff-Appellants rely upon
the previously cited regulations of the Department of Agriculture, Food Stamp Department.

Those regulations do not apply
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to regulate judicial proceedings.

This point was fully set

forth in Point II.
Plaintiff-Appellants have misconstrued the regulations
pertaining to fraud determinations even if the Court was to
apply the regulations.

They assert that two separate actions

must be taken in determination of fraudulent receipt of food
stamps.

(Plaintiff-Appellants' brief at page 13}. The regulations

do not require a bifurcated process wherein fraud is first
determined and then judgment obtained.
The specifications for collection after a judgment
is obtained do not make the judgment of no affect as PlaintiffAppellants seem to assert.

The regulations merely make require-

ments of the State before the State may utilize further powers
of the court to enforce.

Again, failure to comply with such

regulations by the State is inapplicable to the jurisdiction
of the court, but goes only to the State's compliance with the
Federal regulations for State eligibility in the program.
Plaintiff-Appellants attempt to define the fraud
detennination

as separate from the judgme_n t, making that deter-

mination a declaratory judgment, and thereby outside the jurisdiction because i t is not for money only.
A declaratory judgment is generally accepted to be:
One which sinply declares the rights of the
parties or e~resses the opinion of. the a:mr-t;:
on a question of law, with.out ordering anything
to be done. Its distinctive characteristics
are that no executory process foll<:Ms as of
rourse nor is it necessary that an actual wrong,
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giv:mg rise to action for damages should
have been done, or be imnediately threatened.
Black' s Law Dictionary, citing Petition of
Kariher, 284 Pa. 455, 131 A., 265, 268.
The State is not asking for a declaration of the
rights of the parties.

The State is requesting a money

judgment for food stamps improperly received by PlaintiffAppellants because of the alleged fraudulent application or
receipt by Plaintiff-Appellants.
A declaratory judgment is not to be made in cases
in which an adequate remedy at law is available.

Watson v.

Washington Preferred Life Ins. Co., 81 Wash. 2d. 403, 502 P.2d
1016, 1019 (Wash., 1972).
in the instant case.

There is an adequate remedy at law

The Small Claims Court will determine

first, if the matter is properly before the courti second1 if
the State has met the burden of the allegations of the
affidaviti third, if the State has a proper claim for which
relief should be grantedi and fourth, if the amount of the
State's claim has been adequately verified as to damages.
Such determinations are properly before the Small Claims Court.
Plaintiff-Appellants in arguing that a determination
as to fraud goes beyond the jurisdiction of the Small Claims
Court effectively eliminate the Small Claims Court's jurisdiction
at all.

If a determination of fraud was outside the scope of

jurisdiction of the Court, many cases would also be a "declaratory
judgment", to-wit:

(1) any contract before the Small Claims

Court wherein fraud was alleged;

(2)

any case in which the amount
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of the claim was in dispute;

(3) any case in which satis-

faction was a term of the contract; (4) any case in which
damages occurred in an accident in which the defending party
was cited to be at fault by the investigating officer; (5) any
case in which one party paid for goods from a check without
sufficient funds.

Such actions commonly are brought to the

Small Claims Court and were intended to be brought there.
Such actions are not "declaratory judgments" and
are contrary to the intent of such judgments.

Plaintiff-

Appellants rely upon Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford Conn.
v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) and the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 USC §2201 to support their
argument that the determination of fraud is a declaratory
judgment.
It would appear that Plaintiff-Appellants have
misrepresented the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act.

In

Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 39 L.Ed. 2d 505, 94 S Ct
1209 (1974) the United States Supreme Court discussed at
length the Act and its purpose.
To dispel these difficulties, Congress in 1934
enacted the r:eclarato:ry Judgrren.t Act, 28 use ~§22012202 (28 USCS §§2201-2202). That Congress plainly
intended declarato:ry relief to act as an alternative
to the strong medicine of the injunction and to be
utilized to test the ronstitutionality of state
criminal statutes in cases where injunctive relief
would be unavailable is amply evidenced by the legislative histo:ry of the Act, traced in full detail
in Penez v. Ledesma, supra at 111-115, 27 L Ed 2d
701, 91 S Ct 674 (separate opinion of Brerlnan, J.) ....

. The Federal Declaratory Judgrrent Act was
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intended to provide an altemati.ve to injunctions
against state officials, except where there was
a federal policy against federal adjudication
of the class of l i ti.gation altogether. . . .
MJreover, the Senate report's clear irrplication
that declaratory relief would have been appropriate
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 69 L
Ed 1070, 45 S Ct 571, 39 ALR 468 (1925), and
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 lE 365,
71 L Ed 303, 47 S ct 114, 54 ALR 1016 (1926), tcth
cases involving federal adjudication of the·
a:msti tutionali ty of a state statute carrying
criminal penalties, and the report's quotation
from Terrace v. Thompson, which also involved
anticipatory federal adjudication of the
a:>nsti tutionali ty of a state criminal statute,
make it plain that Congress anticipated that the
declaratory j udgrnen.t procedure would be used by
the federal oourts to test the Constitutionality
(415 US 46 8) of state criminal statutes. " Id. , at
111-112, 115, 27 L Ed 2d 701.
Steffel, supra at 466 and 467.
The purpose and intent of declaratory judgments is
to set controversies at rest before they lead to repudiation
of obligations, invasion of rights, and the commission of
wrongs.

State v. Lawson, 2 So 2d 765, 767 (Ala 1941).

The action before this Court had already become an obligation
of the Plaintiff-Appellants.
The Plaintiff-Appellants argue both that executory
process-follows as of course and that it does not.

If executory

process doBs not follow as of course and Plaintiff-Appellants
were correct in their position that the proceeding must be
bifurcated, then the Small Claims Court action would be in
full compliance with the rules.
Plaintiff-Appellants even state such to be the case
at page 13 of Plaintiff-Appellants brief, to-wit:
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'As a general staterrent, the District Court's
decision is correct in holding that a Small
Clairrs Court can find that rroney is due and owing
based on its finding that fraud was comnitted
with.out running afoul of that Court's incapacity
to render declaratory judgrrents. But the character
of the relief sought must detennine the relief to
be afforded ... 11

The character of the relief sought was the award of
a money judgment.

As such, the Small Claims Court had juris-

diction.
The action is not one to stablize rights.

The right

of the State to collect on food stamp overpayment cases is a
clearly legislated right. 7 CFR 270 et seq.

The State does

not have to have rights declared when they have been legislatively declared.
The action sought was not a declaratory judgment,
but was an action for collection of money pursuant to the
regulations and was appropriately brought in Small Claims
Court.
CONCLUSION
The Memorandum Decision of the Second Judicial
District court should be upheld and the case be determined
on its merits by the Small Claims Court.

The Food Stamp Act

sets forth three entirely separate means of collection for
food stamp overpayments and in setting those regulations
forth could not and did not intend to bar civil court jurisdiction when the

regulations for administrative proceedings

were not followed.
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The rules do not regulate judicial proceedings
but merely set forth a minimum standard of due process.
Plaintiff-Appellants have been afforded full due process in
these matters including adequate notice.
Small Claims Court is not making a declaratory
judgment when it determines a claim of fraud and therefore
·

has valid jurisdiction for this action.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of April_,
19 82
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